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An important puzzle in corporate taxation is that effective tax rates have fallen significantly 
while tax revenue has simultaneously risen in most countries. Moreover, the gross 
profitability of firms seems to be lower in high-tax countries, even though standard models of 
international investment would yield the opposite conclusion. We offer an explanation for 
these stylized facts by setting up a simple two-country model of tax competition with 
heterogeneous firms. In this model a unique, asymmetric Nash equilibrium can be shown to 
exist, provided that countries are sufficiently different with respect to their exogenous market 
conditions. In equilibrium the larger country levies the higher tax rate and attracts the high-
cost firms. A simultaneous expansion of both markets intensifies tax competition and causes 
both countries to reduce their tax rates, despite higher corporate tax bases. 
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The development of corporate taxes under conditions of increasing capital and ﬁrm
mobility has been a prominent ﬁeld of study for some time.1 Nevertheless, several
important puzzles remain that have not been explained by the existing literature in a
satisfactory way. We argue in this paper that an important shortcoming of the existing
theory of corporate taxation and capital tax competition is that it typically assumes
all ﬁrms to be identical. By incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity into a simple model of
corporate tax competition we arrive at conclusions that are consistent with some of
the main developments of corporate taxation in the industrialized countries over the
last decades.
A ﬁrst empirical puzzle is that corporate income tax (CIT) rates have fallen signiﬁ-
cantly, yet at the same time corporate tax revenue, as a fraction of GDP, has increased
in most countries. This is summarized in Table 1 for selected OECD countries. The
table shows that statutory corporate tax rates have been strongly reduced in virtually
all countries in the sample since the mid-1980s. This downward trend is still clearly
visible when using the ‘eﬀective average tax rate’, which accounts for the simultane-
ous broadening of tax bases that has occurred in many countries.2 At the same time,
corporate tax revenue has risen in all of the smaller OECD countries in the sample,
whereas the picture for the larger countries is somewhat more mixed. In the (weighted)
OECD average, however, there is a clear increase in corporate tax collections.
Several arguments have been put forth to explain the co-existence of falling tax rates
and rising tax revenues. One is that a rising share of companies has chosen to incorpo-
rate, partly in order to beneﬁt from lower corporate tax rates, as compared to personal
income taxes. Empirical studies indicate, however, that this argument can explain only
a fraction of the observed increase in corporate tax revenues.3 Secondly, several studies
have found empirical evidence that multinational ﬁrms have engaged in income shifting
from high-tax to low-tax countries (e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven,
2008). This can explain why small, low-tax countries have experienced a higher growth
of corporate tax revenues as compared to larger countries (see Table 1), but it cannot
explain an increase in average tax collections.4 It is therefore at least suggestive to
1Wilson (1999) and Fuest et al. (2005) provide thorough surveys of the theoretical literature.
2See Devereux et al. (2002) for an elaboration of this concept, and for a more detailed overview of
the trends in capital income taxation since the 1980s. A recent summary of these trends is found in
Auerbach et al. (2008).
3de Mooij and Nicod` eme (2007) estimate that increased incorporation has raised the corporate
tax-to-GDP ratio by some 0.25 percentage points since the early 1990s, other things being equal.
This increase is substantially lower than the average increase in CIT revenues shown in Table 1, even
though the latter incorporate the negative eﬀect of falling tax rates.
4The proﬁt shifting argument alone can even be expected to lead to falling corporate tax revenues
in the OECD average, as proﬁts are also shifted from (high-tax) OECD countries into tax havens.
1Table 1: Corporate taxation in selected OECD countries∗
statutory eﬀective ave- CIT revenue
tax ratea rage tax rateb (% of GDP)
1985 2005 1985 2005 1985 2005
large countries (> 20 million)
Australia 50 30 37 26 2.6 6.0
Canada 45 36 28 28 2.7 3.5
France 50 34 34 25 1.9 2.4
Germany 63 38 45 32 2.2 1.7
Italy 46 37 31 26 3.1 2.8
Japan 56 40 45 32 5.7 4.2
Spain 35 35 27 26 1.4 3.9
United Kingdom 40 30 28 24 4.7 3.4
United States 50 39 32 29 1.9 3.0
∅ large countriesc 50.3 37.4 34.6 28.6 2.8 3.2
small countries (< 20 million)
Austria 61 25 37 22 1.4 2.2
Belgium 45 34 35 26 2.2 3.5
Finland 60 26 45 21 1.4 3.3
Greece 44 32 36 21 0.7 3.2
Ireland 10 13 5 11 1.1 3.4
Netherlands 43 32 34 25 3.0 3.8
Norway 51 28 36 24 7.3 11.8
Portugal 55 28 48 20 2.2e 2.8
Sweden 60 28 45 21 1.7 3.7
Switzerland 35 34 26 25 1.7 2.6
∅ small countriesc 46.8 29.2 35.2 22.5 2.3 3.9
∅ all countriesc 49.9 36.7 34.7 28.1 2.7 3.3
∅ total OECDd 2.6 3.9
∗ The table lists all countries for which eﬀective average tax rates are available since 1985.
a including local taxes
b base case: real discount rate: 10%, inﬂation rate: 3.5%, depreciation rate: 12.25%, rate of
economic rent: 10% (ﬁnancial return: 20%)
c weighted average in sample, countries weighted by GDP in 2005
d weighted average of all OECD countries; see OECD (2008)
e 1990
Sources: Devereux et al. (2002); www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication id=3210
OECD (2008), Table 12 http://dx.doi.org./10.1787/443744327555
OECD (2009). http://statlinks.oecdcode.org/302009011P1T010.XLS
2explain the divergent developments of corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues
in the past two decades by an increase in the overall proﬁtability of the incorporated
sector during this period. This proposition is supported by the evidence obtained in
detailed country studies for the United Kingdom (Devereux et al., 2004) and Germany
(Becker and Fuest, forthcoming).5
Explaining the growth of CIT revenue (at least partly) by rising overall proﬁts in
the corporate sector raises a further question, however. Standard optimal tax theory
would predict that, other things being equal, tax rates should rise when the tax base
is enlarged, because a marginal tax rate increase generates more additional revenue.
Hence, the trends summarized in Table 1 can only be explained when tax competition
has simultaneously intensiﬁed so that countries ﬁnd it optimal to reduce tax rates,
despite larger corporate tax bases.
A ﬁnal puzzle in corporate taxation arises from the empirical evidence showing that the
gross proﬁtability of ﬁrms is higher, on average, in low-tax countries (e.g. Becker et al.,
2009). Standard models of international investment would suggest the opposite con-
clusion, as capital owners should be compensated for higher tax payments by a higher
gross return to capital in high-tax countries. One explanation for this apparent conﬂict
is that multinational ﬁrms shift income from high-tax to low-tax countries in order to
reduce their worldwide tax payments. Tax practitioners remind us, however, that in-
come shifting is limited by existing rules to trade at arm’s-length prices, which cannot
be costlessly circumvented.6 It is therefore not clear that proﬁt shifting alone is able to
resolve the discrepancy between theoretical and empirical results. An alternative expla-
nation is that there is a real diﬀerence in the gross-of-tax proﬁtability of investments in
high-tax and in low-tax countries. Several recent studies from the international trade
literature show that ﬁrms within an industry diﬀer strongly by their productivity (see
Tybout, 2003 and Bernard et al., 2007 for surveys). Hence, if high-productivity ﬁrms
have a distinct incentive to locate in low-tax countries, then the observed relationship
between taxes and proﬁtability can be explained even in the absence of proﬁt shifting.
As a result, the empirical importance of proﬁt shifting may have been overestimated,
due to the failure to account for productivity diﬀerences between individual ﬁrms.
Our argument in the present paper is that the expansion of proﬁtable markets in
conjunction with heterogeneity between ﬁrms oﬀers a possible explanation for these
5The aggregate increase in proﬁtability may be closely related to sectoral shifts within the incor-
porated sector, in particular, the expansion of the (until recently) highly proﬁtable ﬁnancial sector. In
both the United States and the United Kingdom the share of corporate tax revenues collected from
this sector rose from around 10% in the early 1980s to more than 25% of total CIT revenue in 2003
(Auerbach et al., 2008, Figure 5).
6In the United States, one indicator for the limited possibilities of ﬁrms to minimize their tax
payments is the rising importance of corporate losses that are not deductible from tax. As Auerbach
(2006, p. 14) concludes, this development “casts some doubt on the importance of tax planning
strategies as a vehicle for reducing corporate taxes”.
3stylized facts in a coherent theoretical framework. To develop this argument we set up
a simple model of tax competition where a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms diﬀers exogenously
in their costs of producing a homogeneous good. In this model ﬁrms sort according to
their cost structure and high-cost ﬁrms locate in the high-tax country, whereas low-
cost ﬁrms settle in the low-tax country. This is because (labor) costs of production
are deductible from the corporate tax base and the value of this deduction is higher
for high-cost ﬁrms, and it matters more in the high-tax country. A core simpliﬁcation
in our benchmark model is that each ﬁrm produces only one unit of output, in the
country of its choice. We also show, however, that the basic properties of our simple
model carry over to an extended setting where ﬁrms’ output choices are endogenous.
One important analytical problem arising from ﬁrm heterogeneity is that governments’
best response functions are generally not continuous, as each country has an incentive
to marginally underbid its neighbor’s tax rate and attract the low-cost (and hence high-
proﬁt) ﬁrms. The simplicity of our benchmark model allows us to prove the existence
of a unique Nash equilibrium in tax rates, provided that countries are suﬃciently
diﬀerent with respect to exogenous market conditions. In this equilibrium the larger
country levies a higher tax rate than its smaller neighbor, and it attracts the high-
cost ﬁrms. Based on this asymmetric Nash equilibrium we then consider changes in
market size that raise the overall proﬁtability of ﬁrms. In particular, we show that
a simultaneous expansion of both markets will cause the pivotal ﬁrm to react more
sensitively to corporate taxation, rendering tax competition more aggressive. In the
new equilibrium this leads to falling tax rates in both countries, even though corporate
tax bases are simultaneously enlarged.
Our model is directly related to the recent theoretical literature on trade and ﬁrm
heterogeneity, starting with Melitz’s (2003) well-known model of a monopolistically
competitive industry in which ﬁrms draw their productivity randomly. We incorporate
some of the basic ﬁndings of this line of research into the literature on taxation and
foreign direct investment. The latter has analyzed the interaction between taxes and
ﬁrm location in models of industry agglomeration (see Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Kind
et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Borck and Pﬂ¨ uger, 2006), or in models that
explicitly allow for heterogeneous countries, in particular with respect to market size
(e.g. Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Hauﬂer and Wooton, forthcoming). However,
with few recent exceptions, the heterogeneity of ﬁrms has been neglected so far in the
international tax literature.
A ﬁrst analysis of tax competition in the presence of heterogeneous ﬁrms is Burbidge
et al. (2006). In this paper each ﬁrm’s productivity also diﬀers across regions, however.
This feature eliminates the sorting of ﬁrms on the basis of tax rates only, leading to a
smooth trade-oﬀ for tax policy that is very diﬀerent from the one studied here. Closer
to our setting is Davies and Eckel (forthcoming). Their framework diﬀers from ours
in that they use a model of monopolistic competition and allow for endogenous ﬁrm
4entry. Accordingly the focus of their analysis is on the normative question of whether
tax competition distorts the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the industry, whereas our
analysis aims to explain existing trends in corporate tax policy. Another diﬀerence
is that the model of Davies and Eckel is considerably more complex than ours. As
a result, the authors are not able to establish suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in tax rates. Krautheim and Schmidt-Eisenlohr
(2009) also present a model of tax competition with ﬁrm heterogeneity, but they focus
on the competition for book proﬁts between a large country and a tax haven, rather
than on the location decision of mobile ﬁrms. Finally, some recent studies address
tax policy issues in settings that involve the sorting of heterogeneous ﬁrms in the
presence of international tax diﬀerentials (Becker and Fuest, 2007; Baldwin and Okubo,
forthcoming). These studies are not cast in a tax competition framework, however.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our basic tax competition
model. Section 3 asks under which conditions a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
exists in this model. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of a unilateral and a general increase
in market size on tax rates and tax revenue in each country. Section 5 extends the basic
model to allow for variable outputs of ﬁrms. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Firms
We consider a region of two countries i ∈ {1,2} in which two goods are produced. Our
focus lies on the market for a homogeneous good x, which is served by a total of N ﬁrms.
Entry to the x-industry is restricted because one unit of a speciﬁc factor (‘capital’) is
needed to produce at all, and the supply of this factor is ﬁxed at N.7 Importantly,
the N ﬁrms diﬀer in their costs of production. Speciﬁcally we assume that costs are
drawn randomly and independently from a uniform distribution with c ∈ [c,c]. These
costs reﬂect the ﬁrm-speciﬁc employment of labor that is needed to produce one unit
of output, irrespective of where the output is produced. Each ﬁrm, identiﬁed by its
unit cost c, decides in which country to settle and produce output. Locations diﬀer
with respect to their market potential, in a way described in more detail below. Firms
decide on their location, knowing both countries’ markets and their own costs, and
forming rational expectations about the location of their rivals. Due to restricted entry
to sector x, all ﬁrms in this sector will make positive proﬁts in equilibrium.8
7As we will see below it is immaterial for the present analysis how this factor endowment is
distributed between residents of countries 1 and 2. The factor owners could also be located in a third
country (the rest of the world).
8Alternatively, the model could also endogenize the number of ﬁrms such that each ﬁrm makes a
start-up investment after which it learns its cost. Ex ante, ﬁrms would make expected zero proﬁts,
5The model is closed by the presence of a second, numeraire sector which produces
output under perfectly competitive conditions using labor only. In each country one
unit of labor is required per unit of the numeraire good; hence free trade in this good
equalizes wages across countries at unity. As no proﬁts are generated in the numeraire
sector, it remains in the background throughout our analysis. Aggregate labor supplies
in each country are exogenously given and labor is immobile across countries.
The aim of our analysis is to establish conditions under which a Nash equilibrium
in taxes exists in a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms, and to determine the eﬀects that
market enlargement has on tax rates and tax revenues in each country. These eﬀects
are derived in a two-stage game where governments ﬁrst determine their tax policy and
ﬁrms then decide on their location. To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we focus
only on the location decision of ﬁrms in our benchmark model. Hence we assume that,
irrespective of its costs, each ﬁrm produces exactly one unit of output in equilibrium.
Even though output choices are ﬁxed, it is still true in our benchmark model that the
lowest-cost ﬁrms are the most valuable from the perspective of host countries, in the
sense that attracting them yields the largest gain in tax base. Hence the model retains
the essential qualitative characteristics of ﬁrm heterogeneity for tax policy decisions. In
Section 5 we analyze an extended version of our benchmark model where ﬁrms’ output
choices are endogenized and show that the basic properties of our benchmark model
carry over to this more general setting.
We parameterize the attractiveness of a location by Ai and assume, with no loss of
generality, that country 1 is the more attractive region so that A1 ≥ A2. The simplest
possible interpretation of this model is that each ﬁrm chooses the country where to
locate and then produces only for the local market. In this case Ai acts as an indicator
of market size. We assume that the (inverse) demand function for good x is linear in
each country and given by pi = Ai − ni, where pi is the price of good x and ni is
the number of ﬁrms, and hence total production, in country i. The gross proﬁts of a
ﬁrm with costs c locating in country i are then Ai − ni − c. Alternatively, the model
is also able to accommodate an integrated market in which ﬁrms make an export
platform investment in one of the two countries and sell to the other market from this
location (cf. Ekholm et al., 2007). In that case, output can be freely sold in the common
market, but (exogenous) business conditions diﬀer in the two countries and are more
favorable in country 1. Assuming that costs are composed of unit production costs and
agglomeration costs that are linearly increasing in the number of local ﬁrms, this setup
is formally identical to the case of local markets. In the following we mostly adopt the
interpretation of diﬀerences in local market size and refer to country 1 and country 2
as the ‘large’ and the ‘small’ country, respectively. In several places of our analysis we
emphasize, however, the equivalent interpretation of the model based on an integrated
and not all ﬁrms would be proﬁtable. Our results do not change if countries set taxes after potential
entrants have made the investment, but before proﬁtable ﬁrms decide on their location.
6economy with platform investment.
Each country levies a proportional proﬁt tax at rate ti on the gross proﬁts earned
by the ﬁrms in the x-industry that locate within its jurisdiction. All (labor) costs of
production are deductible from the proﬁt tax base. Let πi(c) ≡ (Ai − ni − c)(1 − ti)
denote the net-of-tax proﬁt of a ﬁrm with cost c in country i. Firms locate in the
country in which the expected net-of tax proﬁt is larger. We denote by ˆ c the costs of
the ﬁrm that is just indiﬀerent between locating in country 1 and in country 2. If ﬁrms
do not all locate in the same country (that is, if c < ˆ c < c) the following arbitrage
condition must hold for this ﬁrm:
(A1 − n1 − ˆ c)(1 − t1) = (A2 − n2 − ˆ c)(1 − t2), n1 + n2 = N. (1)
Through the arbitrage condition (1) the pivotal ﬁrm with costs ˆ c is just compensated
for the higher tax in, say, country 1, either by a larger market in country 1 or by a
smaller number of competitors.
To see how changes in production costs aﬀect ﬁrms’ location choice, we diﬀerentiate
πi(c) with respect to c and obtain
∂πi
∂c
= −(1 − ti) ∀ i ∈ {1,2}. (2)
Hence a given increase in costs will lead to a smaller reduction in net proﬁts in the
high-tax country. The reason is that (labor) costs are deductible from the corporate
tax base and this deduction is more valuable, the higher is the tax rate. Together with
the arbitrage condition of the pivotal ﬁrm [eq. (1)], this implies that all ﬁrms with costs
c > ˆ c will locate in the high-tax country, whereas all ﬁrms with costs c < ˆ c will prefer
to locate in the low-tax region.
With the high-tax country attracting the high-cost ﬁrms, and given our assumption that
costs are uniformly distributed in the interval [c,c], the critical cost level ˆ c determines
the (expected) number of ﬁrms that locate in each country by
ni =
c − ˆ c
c − c
N, nj =
ˆ c − c
c − c
N, i ̸= j, ti > tj. (3)
From (3) and the arbitrage condition (1), we can derive the critical cost level ˆ c as a
function of the exogenous parameters and the endogenous tax rates ti. This depends on
which country chooses the lower tax rate and thus attracts the low-cost ﬁrms. Denoting
by a subscript I (II) the regime where t1 > t2 (t1 < t2) and assuming interior solutions
we get
ˆ cI =
(A2 + cϕ)(1 − t2) − (A1 − N − cϕ)(1 − t1)
ΘI
if t1 > t2, (4a)
ˆ cII =
(A1 + cϕ)(1 − t1) − (A2 − N − cϕ)(1 − t2)
ΘII
if t1 < t2, (4b)
where
ΘI ≡ (ϕ + 1)(1 − t2) + (ϕ − 1)(1 − t1) > 0, (5a)






In expression (6) we thus assume that there is a minimum density of ﬁrms, relative to
the cost spread between the ﬁrms with the highest and those with the lowest costs of
production. This condition is suﬃcient to ensure that ΘI and ΘII are always positive.
Our further analysis is based on the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition: Let ˆ c be the critical value of costs for the ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between
locating in country 1 or country 2. In Regime I, country 1 chooses the higher tax rate
(t1 > t2) and ˆ c is given by (4a). In Regime II, country 2 chooses the higher tax rate
(t2 > t1) and ˆ c is given by (4b).
Equations (3) and (4a)–(4b) determine the number of ﬁrms that locate in each country,
as a function of both tax rates. Diﬀerentiating these equations with respect to t1 and

































In Regime I, where country 1 is the high-tax region, a rise in this country’s tax rate
will raise ˆ cI. Since country 2 hosts all ﬁrms with cost levels between c and ˆ c in this
regime, this implies a rising number of ﬁrms in country 2 and accordingly a fall in n1.
An increase in t2 will instead reduce ˆ cI and thus increase the number of ﬁrms in the
high-tax country 1. In Regime II the signs of both derivatives are reversed.
2.2 Governments
Our analysis is based on the assumption that countries set taxes non-cooperatively
before ﬁrms decide on their location.9 Moreover, we assume that the objective of each
government is to maximize (expected) proﬁt tax revenue Ti in the x-industry. This
assumption implies that governments value tax revenue highly in comparison to con-
sumer and producer surplus. One common explanation is that governments are of a
9For evidence that OECD countries compete over corporate taxes, see Devereux et al. (2008).
8Leviathan type and are therefore mostly interested in tax revenue. Alternatively, gov-
ernments could be politically forced by the working population to maximize revenue
from the corporate income tax, for example because capital is perceived to be gain-
ing from globalization, whereas labor is losing. Whatever its underpinnings, revenue
maximization is a frequent assumption in the tax competition literature. Revenue max-
imization is a particularly plausible assumption when the ﬁrms in the x-industry are
owned by foreigners so that the host country can increase domestic tax revenue at the
expense of the proﬁt income of foreign shareholders.10











[A2 − ϕ(ˆ cI − c) − c]ϕdc, (8)
where the relevant expression for ˆ c is given in (4a) and ϕ is in (6). Diﬀerentiating
country 1’s objective function with respect to t1, using the Leibniz integration rule and







[A1 − ϕ(c − ˆ cI) − c]dc − t1
∂ˆ cI
∂t1
[A1 − 2ϕ(c − ˆ cI) − ˆ cI] = 0.




= (c − ˆ cI)
·
A1 − ϕ(c − ˆ cI) −






[A1 − 2ϕ(c − ˆ cI) − ˆ cI] = 0. (9a)




= (ˆ cI − c)
·
A2 − ϕ(ˆ cI − c) −






[A2 − 2ϕ(ˆ cI − c) − ˆ cI] = 0. (9b)
The interpretation of these ﬁrst-order conditions is straightforward. The ﬁrst term
in (9a) and (9b) gives the increase in revenues induced by a higher tax rate at an
unchanged tax base. This eﬀect is unambiguously positive. The second terms give the
change in the tax base resulting from a small tax increase. Note ﬁrst from (7a) that in
both (9a) and (9b) the second terms have the opposite sign as the squared brackets in
these terms. The squared brackets in turn combine two distinct eﬀects. A tax increase
induces some ﬁrms to relocate to the other country, but the proﬁts of the remaining
ﬁrms rise due to lower market output and accordingly higher prices. For an interior
equilibrium to exist, the ﬁrst of these eﬀects must dominate the second so that the
tax base falls in the country that marginally raises its tax rate. A suﬃcient condition
ensuring this is:
Ai − 2N − c > 0 ∀ i. (10)
10In fact, in the interpretation of our model as one with export platform investment and costless
trade, revenue maximization is equal to welfare maximization when proﬁts accrue to foreigners, because
consumer surplus in each country is ﬁxed by the exogenous number of ﬁrms N.
9Throughout the following analysis we assume that this condition is met. In verbal terms
it states that if all but one ﬁrms locate in the same country, attracting the last ﬁrm
(with the highest cost level c) will still raise aggregate proﬁts in that country.
In Regime II the ﬁrst-order conditions for the two countries’ optimal tax rates are
derived and interpreted analogously. These conditions are given in the appendix.
3 Existence of equilibrium
In this section we ask under which conditions a Nash equilibrium in taxes exists in the
present model. A fundamental existence problem arises in the presence of heterogeneous
ﬁrms because country i’s payoﬀ is not continuous at the other country’s tax rate tj.
If country i overbids country j’s tax rate, then it will attract the high-cost (and thus
low-proﬁt) ﬁrms. If instead country i underbids tj, then it attracts the low-cost (high-
proﬁt) ﬁrms. Hence, each country’s tax revenue experiences an upward jump when the
tax rate is set marginally lower than in the competing jurisdiction. Accordingly, best
response functions can also be discontinuous in our model. These properties require a
thorough analysis of equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
As a starting point for our analysis, a natural benchmark is the case where market
conditions in the two countries are identical (i.e., A1 = A2). In this case it is also
natural to focus on a symmetric situation with t1 = t2 and ask whether this situation
can represent a Nash equilibrium. With identical market conditions and taxes, all ﬁrms
are indiﬀerent as to their location and each ﬁrm will thus locate in each jurisdiction
with probability q = 0.5. In a situation where both countries choose the same tax rate



















In contrast, if country i slightly underbids country j, it will still get half of all ﬁrms,





























Comparing (11a) and (11b) shows that proﬁts and tax revenue are unambiguously
larger for a country that marginally underbids its neighbor, because sales are the same,
but aggregate costs are lower in the low-tax country. Hence for any positive, common
tax rate t1 = t2 there is an incentive for each country to marginally underbid the other,
in order to attract the more proﬁtable ﬁrms. Thus t1 = t2 > 0, with strict inequality,
cannot be a Nash equilibrium pair of taxes. A situation with t1 = t2 = 0 and hence
T1 = T2 = 0 can also not be an equilibrium, because each country can gain by setting
10a positive tax rate and still attract some ﬁrms, obtaining strictly positive tax revenue.
Hence there cannot be a symmetric, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with t1 = t2.
This result implies that, unlike in tax competition models with homogeneous ﬁrms, a
situation of perfect symmetry is not a suitable starting point when ﬁrms diﬀer in their
productivity levels.11 In the following we will therefore focus on asymmetric situations
and consider in turn the cases where the larger country 1 either has the lower or the
higher tax rate than its smaller neighbor.
We ﬁrst ask whether an equilibrium can exist in Regime II. This yields:
Proposition 1 There cannot be an interior tax competition equilibrium in Regime II,
where the larger country (country 1) has the lower tax rate.
Proof: See the appendix.
The technical proof for the proposition is relegated to the appendix. The intuition for
Proposition 1 is, however, straightforward. In its tax optimum, each country equates
the marginal revenue gains and the marginal revenue losses resulting from a small tax
increase [see the discussion of (9a)–(9b)]. If a Regime II equilibrium with t1 < t2 existed,
the larger country 1 would clearly have the larger tax base as it would host more ﬁrms
and these ﬁrms would also be more proﬁtable. Hence the marginal gains from a tax
increase would be unambiguously larger for country 1 than for country 2. Moreover, if
an interior tax equilibrium existed in Regime II, a marginal tax increase of country 1
would cause those ﬁrms to leave the country which have the highest costs among the
ﬁrms that locate in country 1 and hence are least attractive from the perspective of
this country. In contrast, a tax increase by country 2 would create an outﬂow of the
ﬁrms which have the lowest costs and hence are most valuable from the perspective of
country 2. Hence the marginal costs of a small tax increase would be lower for country 1
as compared to country 2. As country 1 would face higher beneﬁts but lower costs from
a tax increase, as compared to country 2, it is impossible in such a situation that the
marginal gains and the marginal losses from a small tax increase can be equal in both
countries simultaneously.12
From Proposition 1 we know that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, if it exists at
all, can only arise in Regime I, with the larger country having the higher tax rate. It
can be shown that a Regime I equilibrium will indeed exist when A1 ≥ A2 + N and
hence the size or productivity advantage of country 1 is suﬃciently large. From (4a)
11It is seen from (11a) and (11b) that there is no revenue gain from marginally underbidding the
neighboring country when c = c and thus the production costs of all ﬁrms are identical. This is the
reason why symmetric tax equilibria generally exist in models with homogenous ﬁrms (e.g. Ottaviano
and van Ypersele, 2005; Hauﬂer and Wooton, forthcoming).
12Note that this argument does not rely on the speciﬁc setup of our benchmark model. Hence it
carries over to the case where ﬁrms’ output choices are endogenous (Section 5).
11this implies that country 1 would attract all ﬁrms, if tax rates were equal in the two
countries (i.e., ˆ cI = c). To establish this result we need to focus on situations in which
the own eﬀects of tax rates on marginal tax revenues dominate the cross eﬀects. This


















is strictly positive. Given this assumption, we are able to prove both existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in Regime I
with t1 > t2 ≥ 0 if country 1 is suﬃciently large relative to country 2, i.e., A1 ≥ A2+N,
and if |J| > 0.
Proof: See the appendix.
To provide an intuition for this proof, we start from a situation where country 2’s tax
rate is zero and country 1’s tax rate is at the highest possible level, denoted ¯ t1, that
is consistent with attracting all ﬁrms to this country. If, at ¯ t1, country 1’s marginal
tax revenues are negative [see eq. (9a)], then ¯ t1 > t2 = 0 must be a Nash equilibrium
because a deviation from ¯ t1 in either direction leads to tax revenue losses for country 1,
whereas country 2 cannot improve upon the outcome of zero tax revenue.13 If, in
contrast, country 1’s marginal tax revenues are positive at ¯ t1, then it will want to raise
its tax rate above ¯ t1. Once t1 has been increased such that ˆ cI > c, country 2 is also able
to attract some ﬁrms. Hence it has an incentive to raise its own tax rate above zero
while still underbidding country 1’s tax rate, in order to maintain a positive tax base.
In this case a mutually optimal set of tax rates with t∗
1 > t∗
2 will exist, which leads to
an interior equilibrium with a positive number of ﬁrms in each country.14
Proposition 2 is our ﬁrst central result, establishing suﬃcient conditions for the exis-
tence of a unique Nash equilibrium in our simple tax competition model with heteroge-
neous ﬁrms. In this equilibrium the larger country is able to levy the higher tax rate.15
Proposition 3 in Davies and Eckel (forthcoming) has a similar ﬂavor, but the authors
are not able to place explicit conditions on the exogenous variables of their model
that ensure the existence of a tax competition equilibrium. Clearly, this is the result
of the simpler structure of our model. Given our assumptions, the suﬃcient condition
A1 ≥ A2 + N has a straightforward interpretation. It implies that the home market
13Strictly speaking, country 2 is indiﬀerent between all tax rates t2 ≥ 0, as its tax base is zero.
14If A1 = A2 + N then only an interior equilibrium can arise, because country 1 could only attract
all ﬁrms by setting a tax rate of zero, which would yield zero revenue.
15The result that the large country levies the higher tax rate is familiar from the literature on capital
tax competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). The novel element in a model with heterogeneous
ﬁrms is that the large country, by imposing the higher tax, also attracts the low-proﬁtability ﬁrms.
12advantage must be suﬃciently large so that, in the absence of taxes, all ﬁrms would
want to settle in the larger country 1. In the location equilibrium with taxes, each ﬁrm
then trades oﬀ the net location advantage of country 1 (taking into account the larger
number of competitors in this country) against the tax advantage of country 2.
Note, ﬁnally, that Proposition 2 is not exhaustive in the sense that an equilibrium may
also exist if A1 ∈ [A2,A2+N], that is, country 1 is larger than country 2 but it will not
host all ﬁrms when tax rates are equal. The diﬃculty that arises in this case is that
country 2 can secure a positive tax base with a strictly positive tax rate. This makes
it potentially interesting for country 1 to underbid country 2’s tax rate, in order to
attract all ﬁrms. Hence, if A1 − A2 < N, any candidate equilibrium must be immune
against such an underbidding strategy by country 1. We know that underbidding is
always proﬁtable when countries are identical (A1 = A2). However, the more asym-
metric countries become, the lower is the taxing power of country 2 and thus the lower
is both the tax rate and the tax base of country 2 in an asymmetric candidate equi-
librium. Hence country 1 can only secure a small additional tax base by underbidding
country 2, and doing so requires a large drop in country 1’s tax rate. This implies that
the incentive for country 1 to underbid its smaller neighbor will monotonically fall as
the size asymmetry grows. From this discussion we expect that there is a critical size
diﬀerence (A1−A2)c < N such that an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium with the
properties of Proposition 2 exists, once this critical threshold is surpassed.16
4 Market expansion and tax competition
As we have discussed in the introduction, there are several empirical indications that
the expansion of highly proﬁtable services, in particular in the banking and ﬁnance
sector, has contributed to rising corporate proﬁts in many OECD countries during the
last decades. In the following we capture this development by an exogenous increase
in the size of either one or both markets in our model, as given by the parameters Ai.
This exogenous market expansion raises the proﬁtability of all ﬁrms in equilibrium.
Our analysis is based on a situation where country 1 is suﬃciently large, relative to
country 2, so that Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, in what follows we focus on an interior tax equilibrium where t∗
1 > t∗
2 >
0 and ˆ cI > c. We then consider small changes in the exogenous model parameters.
By a continuity argument, we assume that an equilibrium still exists after the small
perturbation of the initial equilibrium has taken place.
Our comparative static analysis starts from the optimal tax conditions in Regime I, as
given in (9a)–(9b). Perturbing this equation system yields the following responses of
16These expectations are conﬁrmed by simulations that we have carried out to identify (A1 − A2)c
numerically. See also Table 2 in Section 5.






































(2ϕ − 1) ? 0. (13a)
The ambiguity arises from the eﬀects collected in the round bracket in the ﬁrst term
of (13a). The ﬁrst term in this bracket is positive as ∂ˆ c/∂t2 < 0 from (7a). Intuitively,
an increase in t2 increases the number of ﬁrms in the large country 1 by lowering ˆ c and
this makes it more attractive for country 1 to raise its own tax rate. The second term





Θ3 {[2 − t1 − t2 + ϕ(t1 − t2)][(A1 − N − cϕ)(ϕ + 1) + (A2 + cϕ)(ϕ − 1)]} > 0.
This term captures the fact that a rise in t2 lowers ˆ c and thus increases the proﬁtability
of the marginal ﬁrm in country 1. This causes country 1’s marginal ﬁrm to respond
more elastically to changes in t1 and tends to decrease country 1’s tax rate, other things
being equal. The second term in (13a) is positive from (7a) and (6). Overall, country 1’s
best response function can thus be upward or downward sloping.
















(2ϕ + 1) > 0, (13b)
where (7a) is used to sign the eﬀects on the marginal ﬁrm and ∂2ˆ c/(∂t1∂t2) > 0. An
increase in t1 raises the tax base of country 2 and thus raises the beneﬁts for country 2
to also increase its tax rate. At the same time an increase in t1 raises ˆ c and lowers the
proﬁtability of the marginal ﬁrm in country 2. This reduces country 2’s marginal costs
of taxation, as it causes its marginal ﬁrm to react less sensitively to an increase in t2.
The diﬀerence in the slopes of the best responses are caused by the opposite eﬀects that
changes in t1 and t2 have on the proﬁtability of the pivotal ﬁrm. The changing identity
of this ﬁrm aﬀects in turn the sensitivity with which it responds to a tax increase in
the neighboring region. This (additional) interdependence between the tax policies in
the two countries is thus caused only by the presence of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
4.1 Isolated market expansion in country 2
We ﬁrst consider a unilateral increase in the market size of country 2, so that dξ = dA2.
Hence we analyze a ‘catching-up’ process of the region which has the smaller market
17From here on, we suppress the regime index, as all expressions refer to Regime I.
14in our analysis.18 We analyze how this change aﬀects tax rates in both countries and
consider country 1’s tax response ﬁrst. The impact eﬀect of an increase in country 2’s
market potential on the tax rate in country 1 is
∂2T1
∂t1∂A2





















from (4a) and ∂ˆ c2/∂t1∂A2 > 0 from (7a) have been used to sign the eﬀects. Hence
country 1’s tax rate unambiguously falls, upon impact, when A2 is increased. On the
one hand the larger market size of country 2 leads some ﬁrms to relocate to this country.
This reduces country 1’s tax base and hence the marginal beneﬁt of a tax increase [the
ﬁrst part of the ﬁrst term in (14)]. On the other hand, the expansion of country 2’s
market increases the proﬁts of the pivotal ﬁrm, making this ﬁrm more sensitive to tax
changes. This increases the marginal costs of a tax increase in country 1 [the second
part of the ﬁrst term in (14)]. Finally, the second term in (14) is also negative, as the
marginal ﬁrm in country 1 is more proﬁtable after the parameter change, and hence
country 1 loses a larger tax base when losing the marginal ﬁrm.
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[A2 − 2ϕ(ˆ c − c) − ˆ c] , (16)
where ∂ˆ c/∂A2 is given in (15) and ∂ˆ c/(∂t2∂A2) = −(1 − t1)(ϕ − 1)/Θ2 ≤ 0 from (7a).
The ﬁrst two terms in (16) give the increase in country 2’s tax base, induced directly
by A2 and also indirectly by the increase in ˆ c following the change in A2. These terms
are both positive as country 2 can raise more additional revenue by increasing its tax
rate. The third term gives the loss in tax base that country 2 experiences when losing
the marginal ﬁrm. This eﬀect is ambiguous because there are oﬀsetting eﬀects on the
proﬁtability of the pivotal ﬁrm in country 2 (as given in the squared bracket of this
term): market size has risen in country 2, but the marginal ﬁrm in this country also
faces higher costs as before. Finally, the fourth eﬀect is negative, because the increase
in the size of market 2 will make the pivotal ﬁrm respond more sensitively to a tax
increase in country 2. Consequently, we cannot sign (16) in general.
We can, however, sign the overall eﬀect in (16), if we assume that the density of ﬁrms
is suﬃciently low, relative to the cost spread (that is, ϕ is suﬃciently small). Assume,












18A prime empirical example in the OECD is Ireland, whose GDP growth rate since the 1980s has
far outpaced the OECD average. See OECD (2009).
15Intuitively in this case the proﬁtability of the marginal ﬁrm falls from the perspective
of country 2, and this ﬁrm does not respond more elastically to an increase in t2.
Hence the impact response of t2 to the parameter change is unambiguously positive.
We summarize these results in:
Proposition 3 An isolated market expansion in country 2 reduces the tax rate of coun-
try 1 upon impact (for an unchanged level of t2). If the density of ﬁrms is suﬃciently
small (ϕ is low) then an increase in A2 raises the tax rate of country 2 upon impact.
Note that Proposition 3 only makes a statement about the impact eﬀect of the change
in A2 on optimal tax rates. To this must be added the indirect eﬀects that result from
the best response of each country to the initial change in the other country’s tax rate.
These indirect eﬀects tend to reduce t2, whereas their eﬀect on t1 is ambiguous. In
general, the total eﬀects on changes in both countries’ tax rates can therefore not be
signed without imposing further restrictions on the model. Nevertheless, in many cases
it can be expected that the total eﬀects of the change are of the same sign as the impact
eﬀects given in Proposition 3. In these cases our model thus predicts a convergence of
tax rates when the size of the two markets becomes more similar. In particular, one
implication of our model is that the growing size of small, peripheral markets may
impose downward pressure on the tax rates in larger countries, even if tax rates in the
small countries simultaneously rise.
4.2 Market expansion in both countries
Our above analysis has already shown that a growing size of one market may cause the
government of the competing country to reduce its tax rate. In the following we consider
a simultaneous expansion of both markets, as given by dξ = dA1 + dA2 ≡ dA. This
speciﬁcation aims to capture the fact that common technological and economic factors,
such as the IT ‘revolution’ or global economic integration, have expanded the markets
of diﬀerent potential host countries simultaneously. This is most clearly expressed in the
interpretation of our model as one with export platform investment (see Section 2.1),
where a positive shock occurs to the overall size of the common, integrated market in
which the investment is made.
Our analysis starts from an initial situation where A1 = A2+N ensuring, from Proposi-
tion 2, that an interior tax equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We perturb the initial
equilibrium and show that the exogenous market expansion will reduce tax rates in
both countries, despite the resulting higher proﬁtability of ﬁrms. Our results for this
case refer to the total eﬀects on tax policy, including the strategic responses of each
country to the tax policy change induced in the neighboring jurisdiction.
16We ﬁrst show that the impact eﬀect of the common market expansion dA on the tax
rate of the larger country 1 is unambiguously negative (see the appendix):
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[A1 − 2ϕ(c − ˆ c) − ˆ c] < 0, (17)







These eﬀects are similar in structure to those in equation (16). The ﬁrst two terms
in (17) describe the change in the proﬁt tax base of country 1. The ﬁrst eﬀect is
positive from the common increase in market size, but the second eﬀect is negative as
the simultaneous increase in A1 and A2 raises ˆ c at unchanged tax rates [see (18)]. The
third eﬀect is negative because the higher proﬁts of the marginal ﬁrm imply a larger
loss in country 1’s tax base when this ﬁrm relocates. Finally, the fourth eﬀect is also
negative, indicating that the marginal ﬁrm will react more sensitively to an increase
in t1 after its proﬁtability has risen. It is shown in the appendix that the positive ﬁrst
eﬀect is dominated by the other three. Hence the impact eﬀect of a simultaneous and
equal increase in A1 and A2 on country 1’s tax rate is unambiguously negative.
Proceeding analogously for country 2, it turns out that the impact eﬀect on this coun-
try’s tax rate is exactly zero (see the appendix):
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[A2 − 2ϕ(ˆ c − c) − ˆ c] = 0, (19)
where ∂ˆ c/∂A > 0 is given in (18) and ∂2ˆ c/(∂t2∂A) < 0 follows from (7a).
The ﬁrst two eﬀects are now both positive, because the increase in ˆ c also works to
increase the tax base of country 2. The third eﬀect is ambiguous for country 2, because
there are counteracting eﬀects on the proﬁtability of its marginal ﬁrm. Finally, the
fourth term in (19) is negative. In sum, these eﬀects just oﬀset each other and the
induced impact eﬀect on t2 is zero. The intuition for this result is that the initial
condition A1 = A2+N is maintained by the simultaneous and equal increase in market
size. In this case we know from our discussion of Proposition 2 that the taxing power
of country 2 depends only on the tax rate set by country 1.
The critical diﬀerence between (17) and (19) is that a simultaneous expansion of both
markets increases the proﬁtability of ﬁrms and thus raises the importance of the initial
diﬀerence in proﬁt tax rates. Hence, if tax rates were (hypothetically) held ﬁxed at their
initial levels, some of the moderate-cost ﬁrms that initially located in country 1 would
ﬁnd it in their interest to relocate to country 2, once the positive shock has occurred























































































in both countries. It is this relocation of ﬁrms as a result of higher gross proﬁts which
forces country 1, but not country 2, to lower its tax rate upon impact.
We have now determined all the terms that are needed to evaluate the total eﬀect of
the simultaneous increase in A1 and A2 on the optimal tax rates. Substituting (13a),




























Proposition 4 Starting from an initial equilibrium where country 1 is substantially
larger than country 2 (A1 = A2 + N), a simultaneous and equal expansion of both
markets, dA1 = dA2 > 0, reduces equilibrium tax rates in both countries.
Proposition 4 is illustrated with the help of Figure 1, where panels (a) and (b) corre-
spond to the cases where country 1’s best response function is downward or upward
sloping, respectively.19 Upon impact, the expansion of both countries’ markets shifts
the best response function of country 1 to the left, but it does not cause a shift in the
best response function of country 2. In the new equilibrium, country 1’s tax rate is
thus unambiguously reduced, no matter whether this country’s best response is down-
ward or upward sloping. The fall in t1 will in turn lead to a downward adjustment of
country 2’s tax rate, as the equilibrium moves along this country’s upward sloping best
reply.
19The ﬁgure is conﬁned to the tax ranges where best responses are continuous in both countries.
18Finally we determine the eﬀects of the simultaneous change in market size on (expected)















We distinguish again between the direct (impact) eﬀect for given tax rates, and the
indirect eﬀect due to an adjusted tax rate of the neighboring country. From eq. (8)
the direct eﬀects in (21) are simply the ﬁrst two terms in (17) and (19), respectively,
multiplied by the corresponding tax rate. This yields an ambiguous impact eﬀect of
the common increase in market size on tax revenues in country 1. While the proﬁt
tax base of the ﬁrms remaining in country 1 is increased, some ﬁrms will relocate to
country 2 as they react more sensitively to the pre-existing tax diﬀerential. Hence the
net eﬀect on the proﬁt tax base in country 1 is uncertain. In contrast, the proﬁt tax
base of country 2 rises from both the higher proﬁtability of the ﬁrms that are located
in country 2 initially, and from the relocation of ﬁrms to this country following the
external shock. Hence the direct eﬀect of the simultaneous and equal increases in A1
and A2 on country 2’s tax revenues is unambiguously positive. We sum up these results
in our ﬁnal proposition:
Proposition 5 Starting from an initial equilibrium with A1 = A2+N, a simultaneous
and equal increase in market size dA1 = dA2 > 0 unambiguously raises the tax base in
country 2 upon impact, whereas the eﬀect on country 1’s tax base is ambiguous.
The indirect eﬀects in (21) are negative for both countries, however. It is straightforward
to establish that ∂Ti/∂tj > 0 ∀ i, that is, each country beneﬁts from a tax increase in
the other country. Since the expansion of markets lowers tax rates in both countries
by Proposition 4, each country will accordingly lose from the induced tax reduction
in the neighboring jurisdiction. Therefore, even though both markets expand and the
aggregate proﬁt tax base in the two countries taken together will unambiguously rise,
the eﬀect on tax revenues is ambiguous in both countries.
Clearly, the results from our simple model cannot be more than suggestive when they
are compared with the actual developments in corporate tax policy among the OECD
countries (see Table 1). Nevertheless, there are some notable consistencies. Firstly, we
have shown that an overall increase in the proﬁtability of ﬁrms can be accompanied
by falling tax rates, as the rise in ﬁrms’ proﬁts triggers more severe tax competition
(Proposition 4). Moreover, and contrary to what is often argued, our model implies
that more aggressive tax competition following the expansion of markets is initiated by
the large, high-tax country, whereas the small country merely responds to this tax cut
by adjusting its own tax downward. Against this background it is interesting to recall
that the ﬁrst major corporate tax reforms were initiated by the United Kingdom and
19the United States in the mid-1980s, following a period of deregulation and GDP growth
in both of these economies.20 Only then did smaller countries in Europe and elsewhere
start to enact similar reforms. Finally, we have shown that an overall increase in ﬁrm
proﬁtability raises the tax base of the small country upon impact, whereas the eﬀect
on the large country’s tax base is ambiguous (Proposition 5). These diﬀerences are
consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that corporate tax revenue in the small, low-tax
OECD countries has unambiguously risen, whereas the eﬀect on tax revenue in the
large, high-tax countries has been mixed.
With respect to the existing literature, the distinguishing feature of the present analysis
has been the focus on expanding markets as the underlying shock to tax policies, in
conjunction with ﬁrm heterogeneity. The previous literature on the subject has mostly
relied on exogenous reductions in (broadly deﬁned) ‘mobility costs’ of ﬁrms, in order to
motivate stiﬀer tax competition and falling levels of capital taxation (see, e.g., Kind et
al., 2005). In the present model we have shown that declining tax rates can alternatively,
and perhaps surprisingly, be explained by a general increase in market potential. In
particular, this argument also applies to an increase in the size of a common market,
which raises the proﬁtability of an export platform investment made by multinational
ﬁrms.21 We show that, as a result of its rising proﬁtability, the pivotal ﬁrm becomes
more sensitive to proﬁt taxes and optimal tax rates in all countries may fall. Thus tax
competition for heterogeneous multinationals does not ease when the target region as
a whole becomes more attractive.
5 Extension: The model with variable outputs
In this section we brieﬂy consider an extended version of our model where each ﬁrm,
when deciding to locate in a particular country, simultaneously decides to set up a plant
of a certain capacity. Hence the location and output choices are made simultaneously,
before each ﬁrm learns the cost structure of its competitors.22
Let qi(c) denote the output of a ﬁrm of type c locating in country i. This output is
determined from maximizing expected after-tax proﬁts πi = (1 − ti)qi(pi − c). The
ﬁrst-order condition for a ﬁrm in country i is pi(qi + ˆ Q−i) + qip′(qi + ˆ Q−i) − c = 0,
where ˆ Q−i denotes the aggregate expected output of all rival ﬁrms in country i and
p′ is the derivative of the demand function. With linear demand, the optimal output
20The United Kingdom lowered its statutory corporate tax rate in several stages from 52% in 1982
to 35% in 1986. The United States reduced its corporate tax rate from 50% to 39% in 1987.
21Firm heterogeneity is also observed among multinationals, which are found to be more productive,
on average, than ﬁrms which export or serve their local market only. See Helpman et al. (2004).
22Formally, this is a Bayesian Cournot game similar to Long et al. (2009), which is extended to the
simultaneous location choice of ﬁrms.
20choice of a ﬁrm with cost c in country i is
qi(c) = (Ai − ˆ Q−i − c)/2 . (22)
Using (22) leads to optimized after-tax proﬁts equal to πi = (1−ti)[qi(c)]2 ∀ i ∈ {1,2}.
If an interior equilibrium exists with ﬁrms locating in both countries, then there must
be a ﬁrm with a critical cost level ˆ c that is indiﬀerent between the two locations:
(1 − t1)[q1(ˆ c)]
2 = (1 − t2)[q2(ˆ c)]





It follows from (23) that the pivotal ﬁrm produces a higher level of output in the
high-tax country. In Regime I, where country 1 chooses the higher tax rate, the pivotal
ﬁrm’s output will thus be higher in country 1.
Where do ﬁrms with costs slightly above ˆ c locate? To answer this question, we consider
the eﬀects of a small increase in costs on after-tax proﬁts in each of the two countries,
starting from the critical cost level ˆ c. Using (22) and (23) yields
dπ1(ˆ c)
dc







= −(1 − t2)q2(ˆ c). (24)
Equation (24) shows that the negative eﬀects on after-tax proﬁts of an increase in
production costs are smaller in absolute value in the high-tax country 1. As maximized
proﬁts are monotonic in c this implies that all ﬁrms with c > ˆ c will have higher after-
tax proﬁts in country 1, whereas all ﬁrms with c < ˆ c have higher after-tax proﬁts in
country 2. Hence, as in our benchmark model [cf. eq. (2)], high-cost ﬁrms will locate
in the high-tax country in the location equilibrium.
It is then straightforward to derive the rival ﬁrms’ aggregate output in each country,
ˆ Q−1 and ˆ Q−2, and the expressions for expected tax revenue in each country. This is
done in the Appendix. The extended model is too complex, however, to be solved
analytically. We therefore carried out simulation analyses, whose primary aim is to
establish conditions under which a Nash equilibrium in taxes exists in the extended
model.
Following our argument in Section 3 above, a non-cooperative tax equilibrium should
exist, if the diﬀerence in the market size parameters Ai is suﬃciently large. More
precisely, a suﬃcient condition for existence should be that, if tax rates were (hypo-
thetically) set at the same level in both countries, all production would take place in
the larger market. In contrast to our benchmark model this condition cannot solely be
expressed in terms of exogenous variables, because aggregate production is now endoge-
nous. Nevertheless, our simulations show that the basic argument made in Section 3
carries over to the extended model. The simulation results are presented in Table 2.
21Table 2: Nash equilibria in the extended model with variable output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A1 t1 t2 T1 T2 ˆ c Q1 Q2 ˆ q1 ˆ q2
CASE 1: A2 = 60, N = 3, c = 13, c = 10
70 – – – – – – – – –
75 0.835 0.759 190.63 97.33 11.29 22.77 14.88 13.31 11.53
80 0.845 0.746 226.36 94.49 11.25 24.98 14.55 14.27 11.64
90 0.861 0.722 307.25 89.18 11.18 29.45 13.92 16.18 11.80
CASE 2: A2 = 30, N = 2, c = 2, c = 0
33 – – – – – – – – –
35 0.614 0.524 60.13 33.02 0.85 7.52 5.17 6.54 6.08
40 0.649 0.478 88.14 27.74 0.74 9.24 4.64 7.33 6.27
45 0.678 0.435 121.85 23.11 0.65 11.00 4.16 8.15 6.40
Notes : Qi: total production in country i; ˆ qi: production per ﬁrm in country i (= Qi/ni)
The two cases shown in Table 2 yield qualitatively similar results; hence it is suﬃcient
to discuss Case 1 in more detail. Here we ﬁx the value of A2 = 60 and consider
diﬀerent values of A1. For A1 = 70 the size diﬀerential between the two markets is
too small to permit the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For values of
A1 ≥ 75, however, a Nash equilibrium exists with country 1 as the high-tax country.23
Corresponding to our benchmark model, column (6) shows that the expected number of
ﬁrms in country 1 exceeds that in country 2. Moreover, aggregate output is also higher
in country 1 [columns (7)–(8)]. Finally, columns (9) and (10) show that the average
output per ﬁrm is higher in country 1, even though this country hosts the high-cost
ﬁrms. This is due to the discontinuous jump in output at the cost level ˆ c [cf. eq. (23)].
These results show that the basic properties of our benchmark model carry over to an
extended setting with variable outputs of ﬁrms.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have employed a simple model of tax competition for heterogeneous,
internationally mobile ﬁrms. This model leads to clear predictions regarding the inter-
action between market conditions, the cost structure of ﬁrms locating in a particular
country, and tax policies. A ﬁrst result is that ﬁrms sort according to their productiv-
23To determine the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we compute tax rates and tax
revenues in a constrained equilibrium where country 1 is exogenously taken to be the high-tax country.
We then test whether country 1 can increase its tax revenue by marginally undercutting the tax rate
that country 2 chooses in this constrained equilibrium. A (unconstrained) Nash equilibrium in taxes
exists iﬀ country 1 can not increase its revenues by switching to Regime II.
22ity, with low-cost ﬁrms settling in the low-tax country. This result is consistent with
the empirical observation that the average gross proﬁtability of investments is higher
in low-tax countries. It thus oﬀers a rivaling explanation for this stylized fact, which
has so far been exclusively ascribed to income shifting by multinational ﬁrms. This is
a potentially important ﬁnding from a policy perspective because the perceived em-
pirical importance of income shifting has been a major motivation for several recent
corporate tax reforms (such as the German tax reform of 2008). To the extent that
low corporate tax bases in high-tax countries are indeed caused by low-proﬁtability
investments, rather than by proﬁt shifting, the focus of these reforms may have been
partly misplaced.
A second result of our analysis is that a common increase in the market potential of
host countries can lead to intensiﬁed tax competition and reduced tax rates in both
countries while corporate tax bases are simultaneously increased. The reason is that
the pivotal ﬁrm in each country will experience higher proﬁts, causing it to react
more sensitively to changes in tax rates. This ﬁnding oﬀers one possible explanation
for the puzzling fact that falling tax rates and increasing corporate tax receipts have
occurred simultaneously in many OECD countries. At the same time, our results are
also consistent with the observation that the growth in corporate tax revenue seems
to have been more robust among small, low-tax countries than among their larger,
high-tax neighbors.
In order to bring these results forward, an important assumption in the present paper
has been that the output of each ﬁrm is ﬁxed. It is known from the recent interna-
tional trade literature that when ﬁrm size is endogenized, then expanding the size of a
common market will beneﬁt the productive ﬁrms more than proportionately, shifting
market shares from high-cost to low-cost ﬁrms. As our extended model has shown,
the small country still levies the lower proﬁt tax rate in this case, and it attracts the
low-cost ﬁrms. However, tax competition may become more severe when ﬁrm size is
endogenous because gross proﬁts - and hence corporate tax revenue - increase more
than proportionately with a decrease in production costs. A further extension of our
analysis would be to give governments a second instrument in the competition for the
most proﬁtable ﬁrms, by letting them choose to which extent production costs are tax-
deductible. This would allow to study the tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening reforms,
which have occurred in many countries, in a setting with ﬁrm heterogeneity. We leave
these extensions to future research.
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Optimal tax rates in Regime II











[A2 − ϕ(c − ˆ c) − c]ϕdc, (A.1)
where the relevant expression for ˆ c is now given in (4b). Diﬀerentiating with respect
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·
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·
A2 − ϕ(c − ˆ cII) −






[A2 − 2ϕ(c − ˆ cII) − ˆ cII] = 0.
(A.2)
Proof of Proposition 1
Rewriting the two expressions in (A.2) yields
t
II




¶−1 [A1 − ϕ(ˆ cII − c) − 0.5(ˆ cII + c)]








¶−1 [A2 − ϕ(c − ˆ cII) − 0.5(c + ˆ cII)]
[A2 − 2ϕ(c − ˆ cII) − ˆ cII]
. (A.4)
A Regime II equilibrium is deﬁned by t1 < t2. Hence for such an equilibrium to exist,
at least one of the three positive terms in (A.3) must be smaller than the corresponding
term in (A.4). In the following we compare the three terms in turn, always starting
from the assumption that t1 < t2.
(i) (ˆ cII − c) < (c − ˆ cII) =⇒ 2ˆ cII − c − c < 0
Using (4b) and performing straightforward manipulations we obtain
2ˆ cII − c − c =
1
ΘII
{2(A1 − A2)(1 − t2) + (t2 − t1)[2A1 − N − (c + c)]} > 0. (A.5)
This is unambiguously positive in Regime II because (i) A1 > A2 by our convention
that country 1 is the larger one, (ii) t2 > t1 by the deﬁnition of Regime II, and (iii)
the term in the squared bracket must be positive from the condition for an interior tax
optimum (10). Hence the ﬁrst condition for tII
1 < tII
2 is not fulﬁlled.
(ii) (−∂ˆ cII/∂t1)−1 < (∂ˆ cII/∂t2)−1 =⇒ (−∂ˆ cII/∂t1) > (∂ˆ cII/∂t2)
It is immediately seen from (7b) that this condition is also not fulﬁlled in Regime II,
where t1 < t2.
(iii) ΓI ≡ [A1 − ϕ(ˆ cII − c) − 0.5(ˆ cII + c)][A2 − 2ϕ(c − ˆ cII) − ˆ cII]
−[A1 − 2ϕ(ˆ cII − c) − ˆ cII][A2 − ϕ(c − ˆ cII) − 0.5(c + ˆ cII)] < 0
24Multiplying out the terms on the RHS, rearranging terms and performing several
straightforward manipulations yields, in a ﬁrst step
ΓI = 0.5(A1 − A2)(c − ˆ cII) + A2ϕ(2ˆ cII − c − c) − (A1 − A2)ϕ(c − ˆ cII),
+ 0.5(A2 − ˆ cII)(c − c) + ˆ cIIϕ(2ˆ cII − c − c) − 2ϕ(ˆ c
2
II − cc).
Combining the last two terms and expanding this can be rewritten as
ΓI = 0.5(A1 − A2 + 2n)(c − ˆ cII) + 0.5(A2 − 2N − ˆ cII)(c − c) + ∆, (A.6)
where the ﬁrst two terms are positive from A1 > A2 and (10) and
∆ = (A1 − A2)ϕ(c − ˆ cII) + (A2 − c)ϕ(2ˆ cII − c − c).
To sign ∆ we substitute (A.5), rearrange terms, expand with 2(A2−c)(A1−A2)(t2−t2)




{(t2 − t1)[(A1 − A2)(A2 − c + (ˆ cII − c)) + 2(A2 − c)(A2 − 0.5N − 0.5(c + c))]
+ (A1 − A2)[(A2 − 0.5N − c)(2 − t1 − t2)]} > 0,
which is unambiguously positive from A1 > A2, eq. (10) and t2 − t1 > 0 in Regime II.
Hence we unambiguously obtain ΓI > 0 so that the third condition for tII
1 < tII
2 is also
violated. Thus there cannot be an interior Nash equilibrium in Regime II where the
tax rates are given by (A.3) and (A.4) and t1 < t2 holds. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in three steps: (i) we show that reaction functions exist in the
relevant range; (ii) we identify two tax functions, one which makes country 1 attract
all ﬁrms and one which makes country 2 attract all ﬁrms, and show when an interior
solution exists; (iii) we demonstrate that the reaction functions will intersect exactly
once in the case of an interior equilibrium.
(i) Reaction functions exist if there is one and only one optimal ti as a response to each
tj. This is true if the second-order conditions for an interior maximum are fulﬁlled.
From (9a) and (9b) the second-order conditions of the two countries’ optimal tax








































(2ϕ + 1) < 0. (A.8)
In (A.7) and (A.8) both terms are then unambiguously negative from (7a) and (6) as
∂ˆ cI/∂t2
1 > 0 and ∂ˆ cI/∂t2
2 < 0. Hence both countries’ tax revenue functions are strictly
concave in Regime I and reaction functions are well-deﬁned.
(ii) Next, we identify two tax schemes for country 1, as functions of the tax rate of
country 2. First, consider (4a) and determine country 1’s largest possible tax rate which
still induces all ﬁrms to locate in country 1, i.e., ˆ cI = c. We denote this tax rate by τ:
τ(t2) ≡
A1 − A2 − N + t2(A2 − c)
A1 − N − c
, τ(0) =
A1 − A2 − N
A1 − N − c
≥ 0, τ(1) = 1. (A.9)
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Expression (A.9) shows that τ is linearly increasing with t2. If A1 = A2 + N, then
τ(0) = 0. Second, consider (4a) again and determine country 1’s smallest tax rate
which makes all ﬁrms locate in country 2, i.e., ˆ cI = c. This tax is denoted by σ:
σ(t2) ≡
A1 − A2 + N + t2(A2 − N − c)
A1 − c
, σ(0) =
A1 − A2 + N
A1 − c
> 0, σ(1) = 1.
(A.10)
Expression (A.10) shows that σ also increases linearly with t2. Of course, σ(t2) > τ(t2)
for all t2 ∈ [0,1[. Both tax schemes are shown in Figure 2.
Any equilibrium must be found strictly in between the τ– and the σ–lines in Figure 2:
there is no equilibrium on the σ–line because country 1 would attract no ﬁrm but could
do so with a positive tax rate. Furthermore, there is no equilibrium on the τ–line for
t2 > 0 because country 2 has no tax base but could generate tax revenues by reducing
t2. The only equilibrium candidate on the τ–line is τ(0). At this point, given by point B
in Figure 2, country 2 cannot do better by lowering its tax rate, as this would imply
negative tax revenue if it attracted any ﬁrms. Whether τ(0) is an equilibrium depends
on the marginal tax revenues of country 1 at τ(0):
∂T1
∂t1
(τ(0),0) = (c − c)
µ






(A1 − N − c)(A1 − 2N − c)(A1 − A2 − N)
(1 + ϕ)(A1 − A2 − N) + 2ϕ(A2 − c)
.
If (A.11) is negative, then t1 = τ(0), t2 = 0 is the unique equilibrium, featuring full
agglomeration of ﬁrms in country 1. If (A.11) is positive, country 1’s best response to
t2 = 0 is a tax rate t1 > τ(0). This is indicated in Figure 2 by a point such as A.1
(iii) We now turn to existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium if (A.11) is positive.
We have already determined two points on the reaction curves: if (A.11) is positive,
country 1’s reaction curve starts at A while t2 = 0 is still country 2’s best response to
1It is easily shown that ∂T1/∂t1(τ(0),0) increases with A2. Thus an interior candidate equilibrium
(as opposed to an equilibrium with full agglomeration) is likely, if country 2 is not too small.
26t1 = τ(0); see point B. We evaluate country 1’s marginal tax revenues (9a) along the
τ–line and country 2’s marginal tax revenues (9b) along the σ–line. The derivatives are




= (c − c)
µ






(1 − t2)((A1 − N − ϕc)(ϕ + 1) + (A2 + ϕc)(A1 − A2 − N))





= (c − c)
µ






(1 − σ(t2))((A1 − N − ϕc)(ϕ + 1) + (A2 + ϕc)(A1 − A2 − N))
(ϕ + 1)(1 − t2) + (ϕ − 1)(1 − σ(t2))
.
Note that ∂T1/∂t1(τ(0),0) = ∂T τ




















Since tax revenues are a continuous and twice diﬀerentiable function of tax rates, (A.14)
proves that at least one tax rate t2, with 0 < t2 < 1, must exist such that ∂T τ
1 /∂t1 = 0;
this is shown by a point such as C in Figure 2. Similarly, at least one tax rate t1 with
0 < t1 < 1 must exist such that ∂T σ
2 /∂t2 = 0; see point D in Figure 2. Point C is thus
also on the reaction curve of country 1 and D is on the reaction curve of country 2.
Since reaction functions are continuous, they must run from A to C for country 1 and
from B to D for country 2. Consequently, they must intersect at least once. Due to
|J| > 0, they can intersect only once because any second intersection would imply
|J| < 0 from the continuity of best responses. This proves existence and uniqueness for
the interior candidate equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
To sign (17), it suﬃces to compare the ﬁrst and the third term on the RHS of the
equation. The squared bracket in the ﬁrst term is unambiguously smaller than the
corresponding bracket in the third term. Hence a suﬃcient condition for (17) to be
negative is that (c − ˆ c) < t1(∂ˆ c/∂t1). But this last inequality is implied by the ﬁrst-
order condition for country 1’s initial tax rate (9a). In (9a), the squared bracket in the
ﬁrst term is unambiguously larger than the squared bracket in the second term when
ϕ > 1 [cf. (6)]. Hence (c− ˆ c) < t1(∂ˆ c/∂t1) must hold for the two terms to sum to zero.
To sign (19), we simplify the value for ˆ cI in (4a) when A1 = A2+N holds in the initial
equilibrium. This yields
ˆ cI|A1=A2+N =
A2(t1 − t2) + c ϕ (2 − t1 − t2)
t1 − t2 + ϕ(2 − t1 − t2)
(A.15)























27We decompose ∂2T2/(∂t2∂A) = ψ1 +ψ2, where ψ1 is the sum of the ﬁrst and the third
term in (19), whereas ψ2 stands for the second and the fourth term. Using (A.15)–
(A.16) and performing straightforward manipulations gives
Ψ1 =
·


























+ (ˆ c − c)
¸·
A2 − ϕ(ˆ c − c) −











(ˆ c − c)













(A2 − c)(t1 − t2)/2 + 2ϕ(1 − t1)




Again using (A.15)–(A.16) and (5a) shows that the term in squared brackets is zero
and hence ψ1 = 0.








A2 − ϕ(ˆ c − c) −
(ˆ c + c)
2
¸
− 2ϕ(1 − t2)t2[A2 − 2ϕ(ˆ c − c) − ˆ c]
¾
.
Substituting t2 from (9b) into the second term and using (A.15)–(A.16) shows that
ψ2 = 0. Hence ∂2T2/(∂t2∂A) = 0. Using these results in (20) yields Proposition 4. ¤
Appendix to Section 5
When all high-cost ﬁrms locate in country 1, a ﬁrm that wants to locate in this country
expects an aggregate output of all rival ﬁrms equal to
ˆ Q−1 = (N − 1)
Z c
ˆ c





(N − 1)[2(A1 − ˆ Q−1) − ˆ c − c](c − ˆ c)
c − c
.
Solving this for ˆ Q−1 gives
ˆ Q−1 =
(N − 1)(2A1 − ˆ c − c)(c − ˆ c)
2[(N + 1)c − (N − 1)ˆ c − 2c]
. (A.18)
Similarly, for a ﬁrm contemplating to locate in country 2 the expected output of all
rival ﬁrms in this country is
ˆ Q−2 = (N − 1)
Z ˆ c
c




⇒ ˆ Q−2 =
(N − 1)(2A2 − ˆ c − c)(ˆ c − c)
2[(N − 1)ˆ c − (N + 1)c + 2c]
.
(A.19)


















(A2 − c − ˆ Q2)3 − (A2 − ˆ c − ˆ Q2)3
12(c − c)
, (A.20)
where ˆ Q−1 and ˆ Q−2 are given in (A.18) and (A.19), respectively.
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